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 Experiential knowledge challenges ‘normality’ and individualised 
citizenship: towards ‘another way of being’  
(Pamela Fisher, in press 2007) 
 
Abstract 
This paper draws on the narratives of parents of disabled babies in order to 
conceptualise enabling care. The analysis emerges from the Sheffield site of 
an ESRC research project Parents, Professionals and Disabled Babies: 
Identifying Enabling Care, which is being undertaken by the Universities of 
Sheffield and Newcastle-upon-Tyne.  In New Labour Britain individualised 
citizenship and self-sufficiency are upheld as the embodiment of ‘the good 
life’. A culture of individualised citizenship obliges citizens to strive towards 
maximum independence, interpreted narrowly as self-sufficiency, and acts to  
devalue the lives of some disabled children and their parents.  In the area of 
disability, this reinforces the individual model of disability and fails to properly 
value experiential knowledge acquired in the private sphere. This paper 
suggests that parents are engaging in reflection that counters hegemonic 
understandings by embracing alternative narratives that recognise diversity 
whilst questioning narrowly conceived interpretations of normality. This leads 
to the reconstruction of parental identities through discourses shaped by 
mutuality and interdependence.  
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(i) Introduction: from normalisation to ‘Government of the Soul’  
 
In practical terms, education or welfare systems that operate on the premise 
of normality and the reduction of difference, will always leave some people 
out. It is part of their logic.  Robertson (2001, p. 122) 
 
Historically, the term ‘deviant’ has been applied to a wide range of 
marginalised identities, including disabled people, who could then be deprived 
of their rights and privileges as human beings.  The concept of normalisation, 
developed in resistance to the dehumanising treatment of disabled people, 
was based on a human rights approach that advocated that the normal 
conditions of everyday living should be made available to everyone 
(Walmsely, 2001).  Wolfensberger (1972) took the concept of normalisation, 
that had initially been applied according to a Scandinavian human rights 
approach, and renamed it ‘social role valorisation’ whilst placing a greater 
emphasis on reversing the consequences of social devaluation and stigma.  
Recognising the social constructedness of ‘deviancy’, Wolfensberger’s 
primary objective was the integration of ‘deviant’ or, as he saw them, 
marginalised individuals into society. When compared with their historical 
antecedents, such as incarceration, the normalisation and social role 
valorisation principles constituted a progressive step forward in the education 
and inclusion of marginalised populations, especially people with disabilities.  
However, there has also been the unintended consequence of reinforcing 
narrow interpretations of what constitutes ‘normal’ (Boxall, 2004, p. 28). This 
last point is central to this paper which focuses on the perspectives of parents 
with disabled babies and/or disabled young children.  
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My starting point in this paper is that in the case of families with disabled 
babies and young children the language of inclusion has been mobilised as a 
discourse of self-government as expressed in the managerialist approach to 
care that is reliant upon narrowly conceived performance criteria. Whereas 
the early managerialism of the Thatcher and Major years in the UK was 
primarily concerned with achieving efficiency savings (Pollitt, 1993), modern 
managerialism since 1997 has been expanded to include a particular ‘ethic of 
personhood’ based on individual autonomy (Giddens, 1998), which has been 
adopted as the blueprint for a new ideology of citizenship and self-government 
(du Gay, 2000; Munro, 2003; Newman, 2000; Rose, 1996).  Managerialist 
strategies throughout the public sector, while still concerned with issues of 
‘efficiency, effectiveness and economy’, are also applied ideologically to 
deliver the New Labour vision of responsible citizenship. The intention is that 
excluded groups, such as the elderly, people with disabilities, parents with 
children with disabilities, the young and people from minority ethnic 
backgrounds should be brought into the realm of ‘mainstream’ society 
constructed around notions of independence and paid work. Active citizenship 
is encouraged through self-investment in ‘human capital’, partly supported by 
the ‘opportunity state’ working collaboratively with individuals and families 
through various forms of partnership (see Poole, 2000, p. 109).  Thus, social 
inclusion is sought through the ‘colonization of identity’, whereby marginalised 
groups are transformed into compliant collaborators who have internalised the 
New Labour vision. (Ling, 2000, p.  89).  
 
While empowerment is writ large in policy documents  (see Department of 
Health, 2001; Department for Education and Skills, 2003) in a manner that 
 4 
acknowledges the creativity of individual employees, self-government is  
exercised over both service users and providers in subtle ways (see  
Masschelein and Maartins, 2002; McDonald, 2004). Professionals employed 
within the health and social services are encouraged to transform themselves 
through self-government into entrepreneurial agents without questioning the 
underlying value system that limits understandings of autonomy as something 
to be evaluated, audited and mapped according to pre-determined criteria.  
Individuality is achieved through the performance and mastery of pre-
determined learning objectives and professional competence is reduced to the 
process of acquiring skills necessary for efficiency rather than developing 
insights that promote critical self-reflection or lead to a greater understanding 
of people’s diverse lifeworlds (Askhim, 2003). Within this discourse paid work 
is not only interpreted as a right but also as the first duty of a good citizen, 
except for people with disabilities for whom it has become both a ‘duty and a 
right’ (Williams, 1999, p. 672). Notions of autonomy and independence are 
clearly linked to activities within the public sphere, thereby reinforcing the 
discursive categorisation of disabled people as either self-sufficient workers or 
‘dependent others’ (Sevenhuijsen, 2000, p. 14). While the interests of carers 
and those who are cared for have often been regarded as antagonistic (see, 
for example Watson et al, 2004), the view taken here is that narrow 
interpretations of normality can have a direct and negative impact on the 
status of people with disabilities, who may ‘fail’ to conform to the prevailing 
standards of ‘normality’, whilst  devaluing the role of family members who, in 
the context of mutually rewarding relationships with their disabled children, 
acquire valuable expertise that tends to remain overlooked. 
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(ii) Analytical Framework 
 
The health and social care professions are increasingly being encouraged to 
work towards a partnership model which values clients’ perspectives (Avdi et 
al, 2000, p. 329). This development is now reflected in a number of 
government documents that link education and health to the wider aim of 
social inclusion (for instance, Every Child Matters, DfES, 2003; Choosing 
Health: Making healthy choices easier DoH, 2004). While recent initiatives 
towards more balanced relationships between professionals and clients are 
welcome, they are far from securely embedded in policy which continues to 
promote self-government among individuals and organisations in ways that 
support the values underpinning the existing social system (Lyotard, 1984; 
Ling, 2000, Parton, 2005).  Within this discourse ‘normality’ is constructed as 
contingent upon the attainment of independence, narrowly interpreted as self-
sufficiency (that is as the ability to do things without help or assistance 
especially, I would add, to earn one’s living) (William, 1999, 2002)1. The 
concern to ‘empower’ individuals is driven by a particular view of the subject, 
defined narrowly as the reflexive and ‘autotelic’  (Giddens, 1998) agent of late 
modernity. According to this discourse, the socially excluded are seen as 
unable or unwilling to appropriately manage their lives (Rose, 1996) 
 
I argue here that services are tending to overlook expertise that disabled 
children and their parents acquire in the home environment as this does not  
                                                          
1
 This interpretation should be distinguished from the independence as defined by the independent 
living movement that conceptualises independence in terms of agency (Morris, 1996). Seen from this 
perspective, disabled people are no longer the objects of care but the recipients of support that their 
autonomy and self-determination. 
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fall within the kind of managerialist framework, characterised by Lyotard 
(1984) as ‘peformativity’, that supposedly leads to ‘the good life’, that is, one 
of so-called self-sufficiency. Through highlighting the perspectives of parents, 
this paper contributes to previous research arguing that lay people possess 
expertise by virtue of their experientially acquired knowledge (Busby et al., 
1997; Monaghan, 1999). I suggest here that knowledge learned within the 
private sphere can contribute to more inclusive forms of care that do not 
construct difference as a problem or an abnormality to be resolved through 
technical and assimilationist programmes. This is not intended as a criticism 
of the many committed professionals working within social and medical 
services: many parents speak highly of the services provided.  However, this 
study suggests that professionals are impeded in their quest to provide more 
responsive care by a culture that devalues knowledge that is not ‘legitimised’ 
(Lyotard, 1984). Many  interventions for families with disabled children appear 
to constitute part of a parent management strategy which constructs 
knowledge as something that flows from professional to parent and from the 
public sphere into the private.    As Tronto (1993, p. 135) argues, a political 
order based only on ‘independence and autonomy […] misses a great deal of 
experience, and must somehow hide this point elsewhere. For example, such 
an order must rigidly separate public and private life.’  
 
Against such a discursive backdrop, disabled children and parents of disabled 
children are held individually responsible for adapting as closely as possible to 
‘normality’. It should be pointed out here that the gender neutral term ‘parent’ 
tends to deflect from the reality that it is generally mothers who are the 
primary carers of children and this is more the case when the children are 
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disabled  (see Read, 2000; Traustadottir, 1991, 1995). Moreover, disabled 
children are more likely than other children to be brought up in a household 
with a lone mother (Beresford, 1995 cited in Read, 2000, p. 53). 
 
The focus on  knowledge developed experientially within the private sphere is 
continued in the latter part of this paper in which I point out how parents’ 
understandings are contributing to the development of theoretical and 
philosophical positions that counter the view that ‘the good life’ is only to be 
achieved through aspiring to ‘normality’ as defined by dominant notions of 
independence - that is by entrepreneurial individuals in the public sphere. In 
challenging dominant images of normality this paper contributes to earlier 
work which has argued that parents of disabled children often do not 
subscribe to the personal tragedy model of disability (Glendinning, 1983; 
Goodley and Tregaskis, 2004; Roll-Petterson, 2001 and Carpenter, 2000). 
Whilst acknowledging the considerable contribution made by materialist 
writers, for instance, Barnes (1998), Finkelstein (1991) and Oliver (1990), who 
have provided analyses of the social, economic and material conditions that 
create ‘disability’, this paper questions materialist tendencies to neglect 
impairment.  It  therefore  follows on from poststructuralist research that has 
challenged biologically determined interpretations of learning disabilities by 
drawing on the idea of ‘distributed competence’ to argue that ‘learning 
disabilities’ should not be regarded as a fixed and unchanging category but as 
a largely socially constructed label (Goodley and Rapley, 2002, p. 133).  The 
paper also owes much to feminist writers who have challenged notions of 
independence based on a restricted definition of self-sufficiency and criticised 
instrumentalist approaches to care and their concomitant tendency to 
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devalorise activities and knowledge associated with the private sphere  
(Corker and French 1999; Cushing and Lewis, 2002; Kittay, 2002; Lloyd, 
2001; Morris, 1996, Rössler, 2002; Thomas, 2001; Sevenhuijsen, 1998). 
While I would wish to stress that the goals of autonomy and self-determination 
are crucial for disabled people, who have historically been denied the right to 
exert autonomous choices, this paper equally points to an understanding that 
personal autonomy is essentially something that is found within relationships 
of interdependence. 
 
  
(iii) Methodology 
 
This study is  based on fieldwork conducted in 2004 and 2005 by researchers 
from the University of Sheffield for an ESRC research project Parents, 
Professionals and Babies with Special Care Needs: Identifying Enabling Care, 
(http://www.shef.ac.uk/inclusive-education/disabledbabies/). The fieldwork 
conducted in Sheffield centred on 25 families with disabled babies and/or 
children. In-depth interviews were conducted with the families who were 
divided into 2 groups. The first group of participants, whose children were 
aged between 3 and 5 years old, provided retrospective accounts of their 
experiences, including those of medical and social care services, since the 
birth of their child. The second group involved families who had children up to 
2 ½ years of age at the start of the project. These provided a longitudinal 
perspective through participating in a number of interviews conducted over an 
18-month period. An ethnographic component involved (i) the observation of 
parents, children and professionals in a variety of clinical, social services and 
home settings and (ii) immersion within the wider support networks of parents.  
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The research aimed to identify enabling care from the perspective of parents 
with disabled babies; to examine professional-client relationships; to 
investigate how meanings of ‘impairment’ and ‘disability’ were negotiated and 
constructed; and to look at how these meanings impact on care and 
perceptions of the disabled baby. 
 
The link between stories and the construction of self identity is now well 
theorised (Giddens, 1991; Plummer, 1983; Ricoeur, 1992; Rosenthal, 1993; 
Taylor, 1989) and this has been the experience in recent research in which 
(Fisher and Goodley, in press, 2007) have explored the private experiences of 
subjectivity as distinct from the public presentation of self.  In prioritising 
parents’ stories, we sought to provide our research participants with the space 
to express and develop narratives that resist dominant discourses that frame 
disability in terms of individual deficits.  In this respect, our project also follows 
on from a body of work inspired by Foucault (for instance Radley, 1994; 
Samson, 1995) that identifies medical knowledge as an institutional form of 
social control for the management of deviance.   
 
(iv) Parents question narrow interpretations of ‘normality’ 
In the UK New Labour’s approach to family life was laid down in the 
consultation paper, Supporting Families (Home Office, 1998), a document 
which emphasised the Government’s interest in the family as a forum in which 
the values of good citizenship are learned (Maclean, 2002). As Gillies (2005, 
p.  77) puts it, the instrumental approach adopted in Supporting Families 
‘…depicts parenting not as an intimate relationship, but as an occupation 
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requiring particular knowledge and skills […] The term “parenting support”, in 
particular, describes the method by which parents are encouraged to reflect 
on and regulate their performance, through reference to “expert” advice and 
training.’  Fairclough (2000) argues, that parenting practices are increasingly 
isolated from the interpersonal context of the private sphere and presented as 
methods to be learned that are underpinned by the notion of the reflexive late 
modern agent and individualised citizenship (Gewirtz, 2001; Gillies, 2005). 
 
In the boxed text below I describe my experience of attending, as a researcher, 
an evening class in the north of England that was held for parents of children 
labelled as autistic. My account suggests that the class, based on the medical 
model in its rehabilitation variant, constructed children as developmentally 
delayed and assumed a binary opposition between the categories of normal 
and disabled. The aim of the therapy was to assist parents to work with their 
children in order to correct ‘deviant’ behaviour.  
 
 
 
The deficit model and performativity in the context of a parenting class 
 
I observed an evening class of about 30 parents who have children with the label of 
autism. It was presented as an opportunity for empowerment, to help parents support 
the positive development of their children.  The class was structured primarily around 
identifying the ‘difficulties’ that arise as a result of autism.  These were presented in a 
highly structured manner as the ‘triad of impairments’, that is (i) impaired 
communication; (ii) impaired social relating; and, (iii) restricted and repetitive 
behaviour and interests. Each area was sub-divided into a number of ‘difficulties’: 
impairment of communication was, for instance, presented as including difficulties 
such as ‘uses little facial expression’, ‘uses little gesture’, ’understands and uses 
words literally’, ‘repeats or echoes words’ etc. Binaries of normality and abnormality 
were explicitly reinforced with the autistic child presented as deficient in all areas 
identified.  After a lengthy list of deficits had been described by the professional 
leading the session, one of the participants asked in frustration whether these 
‘problems’ could be addressed or whether it was a merely a case of identifying them. 
The professional leading the group assured her that improvements could and were 
achieved; it was important for parents to have a detailed overview [of problems] so 
that they would be able to work with their children enabling them to desist from their 
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abnormal behaviour, which would, in turn, enable them to live normal and 
independent lives. [my emphasis].  
 
At times, the narrowness of the interpretation of normality bordered on the comic.  It 
was pointed out that children should be taught to accept losing with grace. If they lost 
in a board game, they should learn to say ‘Well done! Congratulations on winning. 
We must have another game some time.’  This advice was greeted with a degree of 
humour from some of the parents who presumably felt such a reaction would be 
unusual even among ‘normal’ children. At no point, was the concept of ‘normality’ 
problematised and there was little reason for positive comment except for one item of 
good news relating to pathology, namely that ‘autistic children have fantastic 
memories’.   
 
The following day I spoke to one of the participants at the class who was the mother 
of a five-year-old autistic boy. She told me, ‘Why don’t they point out that so many of 
the difficulties come from other people’s attitudes? You come away from something 
like that feeling like your child’s a real loser. I think the view presented was very one-
sided.’  
 
Another parent, Olivia, whose 3 year old son has been diagnosed with global 
development delay and autism told me after the class, ‘I hate the word normal. It gets 
used so much -  even therapists use it. And you think, “well why is he not normal  
because what is normal? There’s no definition”. They’ve all got guides about what 
they should be doing at what ages and that is the bible as far as they’re concerned. If 
they’re not doing that then there’s something wrong…. you end up getting very 
depressed.’ 
  
 
The approach in the parenting class described above was premised on binary 
analyses or ‘either or’ frameworks of meaning, located around understandings 
of normal or abnormal, health or impairment, competence or incompetence and 
independent or dependent.  Within this framework, the ‘autistic child’ was 
constructed as deficient and the expected role of the parent was to support 
their child to come as close as possible to normality in order to access the 
rights and responsibilities of full citizenship. Based on what Lyotard (1984, p. 4) 
has termed ‘a thorough exteriorization of knowledge with respect to the knower’ 
knowledge in this context was a commodity to be passed from expert to parent. 
Little, if any, space was provided for knowledge that was not consistent with the 
pre-given framework. Reflection was encouraged by the parents but it was a 
form of reflection that Gur-Ze’ev et al., 2001) acts only to confirm and advance 
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the realm of the currently ‘self-evident’ without raising questions that might 
undermine the rules themselves (Gur-Ze’ev et al., 2001). This kind of reflection 
threatens to deny parents opportunities for thinking about their children in ways 
that are not framed in terms of the deficit model of disability.  
 
Fortunately, parents participating in this study have shown the ability to  
engage in sophisticated reflexivity and to develop counter-narratives that resist 
the view that disability can only be understood in terms of deficiency (see Avdi 
et al., 2000; Oliver, 1990; Murray, 2003; Waltz, 2005).  The experience of 
having a disabled child had, for some parents, led to a deep form of reflection 
that cannot be compared with the type of instrumentalist reflection fostered 
within the ‘autism class’. Instead they are engaging in reflection that challenges 
hegemonic thinking and are gaining insights that resist normalising practices 
and their ideological foundations. Consistent with the findings of Swain and 
French (2000), some parents came to the understanding that difference can be 
regarded  positively.  
 
(v) Creating new narratives 
 
Serious illness, acquired disabilities, and decisions around abortion have been 
previously identified as events that interrupt life narratives (Ezzy, 2000; Frank, 
1985; Fisher & Goodley, in press 2007). Metaphors that carry a sense of 
disorientation, such as losing one’s map (see Frank, 1995, p. 5) or ‘narrative 
wrecks’ (Dworkin, 1993, p. 311), are often applied to evoke the experience of 
such events.  What is disrupted is a coherent sense of life sequence or, as the 
philosopher Carr (1986, p. 96) puts it, ‘the whole which comprises future, 
present and past.’  Creating narrative coherence in the uncertainty endemic to 
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postmodern times is a struggle for everyone but, as Carr (1986) points out, it is 
a struggle that is intensified by events, such as illness, which seriously disrupt 
the anticipated lifestory.  According to Carr (1986, p. 96), a ‘responsibility’ is 
placed on those who undergo interrupted life narrative to create a new story 
which gives the narrator ‘something to live up to’, by reinterpreting the past in a 
way that enables the construction of a new future. This type of experience is 
something which resonates with parents whose life stories are also 
unexpectedly ‘interrrupted’ by the birth of a disabled baby. The creation of new 
meaningful narratives within such circumstances is often a struggle but it is one 
which retrospectively, appears worthwhile.     
 
Ben: ‘another way of being’ 
 
Lesley is a woman with two children with special care needs. The oldest, Ben, 
is just under three. Ben has been diagnosed as severely autistic and is unable 
to communicate with spoken language. However, Lesley explained in detail 
how Ben has sophisticated communication and social skills that were tending to 
be overlooked. As Lesley put it, ‘I think a lot of the things that he does probably 
look meaningless to people, but it seems to me that just about everything Ben 
does has some meaning for him. If we can understand it, it will help us 
communicate.’   
 
Lesley provided numerous examples of Ben’s communicative inventiveness. If 
a favourite book of his borrowed from the nursery had to be returned, Ben 
would place it under a chair to show that he wanted to keep the book a little 
longer. He would flap his arms to convey his pleasure at seeing someone and, 
according to Lesley, was highly astute in assessing people’s feelings towards 
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him. A fleeting glance into someone’s eyes meant a huge amount (see 
Billington, 2006).  Ben had developed a complex signing code with his parents 
that did not rely on conventional communication techniques. Lesley explained 
how Ben had on one occasion ‘lost it’ and bit her hand in response to intense 
frustration.  Full of remorse, Ben had tried to comfort her by taking his favourite 
book to her. ‘That was his way of saying “sorry”’, she explained. Since then 
whenever Ben feels he can’t cope with a situation, he takes hold of Lesley’s 
hand and gestures as though to bite without actually biting. This was Ben’s way 
saying that he temporarily felt unable to cope. Whenever it happens, Lesley 
now responds by removing him from a situation that he perceives as stressful. 
Through encouraging him to communicate on his own terms, Lesley was sure 
that his ‘normal’ social skills were also improving in the sense that he was 
taking a more flexible approach to life because, 
He sort of understands that we’re doing our best … and while it’s not going to 
be perfect, we’re doing our best to help him. If we show that we care about 
understanding what he’s feeling, he can accept more in terms of things not 
being ‘right’.  
 
Lesley felt that interventions that operated according to a deficit model of 
autism and insisted on ‘normal’ communication and behaviour could act in 
ways that were unhelpful. Within the family, they had learned to take Ben on 
his own terms and to accept his communicative code as the starting point. 
While they had been advised that they should try to prevent repetitive 
behaviour developing, Lesley’s view was that repetitive behaviour sometimes 
helped Ben ‘to feel safe’. Once he felt safe, she explained, he communicated 
more, became more receptive to learning, was more likely to tolerate 
deviations from his routine, and was therefore able to progress and acquire 
new skills.  
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Lesley explained that the family had frequently come up against an 
uncomprehending world in which people felt that they were ‘pandering’ to 
Ben’s whims. Nevertheless, she remained convinced that life had become 
much easier for the whole family, especially for Ben, since they had realised 
that having autism was ‘not a disaster but a completely different way of being.’  
Lesley was sure that Ben learned much more when he was valued on his own 
terms and when people worked with him according to his own abilities rather 
than his perceived deficits. Similar to many parents participating in this study, 
Lesley’s confidence regarding her own expertise was growing. She explained, 
It’s very hard for people to accept that we might actually be acquiring 
expertise in this area. That is not intended to threaten anybody but a lot of 
people experience it as professionally threatening. I think they don’t want to 
know about the things that we’ve found out.  
 
Lesley’s perspectives on her son’s autism resonate with a body of research 
that calls for expanded understandings of autism suggesting that the inner life 
of those diagnosed as autistic should be seen more in terms of neuro-diversity 
and less in terms of disability (Baker, 2006; Billington, 2006; Baron-Cohen et 
al, 1993; Happe, 1999). It seems that the parents of children diagnosed as ‘on 
the spectrum’ could offer valuable insights in this respect and that their views 
might usefully be employed to adapt and to develop services that are currently 
delivered on the basis that legitimised expertise is constructed by 
professionals within the public sphere.   
 
(vi) Embodied morality and interdependence 
 
In Moral Understandings, Walker (1998) argues that morality is not a 
dimension of reality beyond or separate from shared life or a distinct and 
detachable set of understandings within it. Moral practices are inextricable 
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from social roles and positions. On this basis, the quest for pure moral 
knowledge is unrealistic. Morality is always embodied and situated and 
created through our relationships with others. The research conducted for this 
study tends to suggest that the parents of disabled babies and children may 
constitute the type of moral community that Walker (1998) had in mind. 
Through their personal experiences of parenting and caring for their children, 
many parents develop insights into the values of mutuality and 
interdependence that transcend dominant notions of ‘normality’ and autonomy 
that are based on ontological separateness.  From this latter perspective, 
each individual is expected to acquire the skills and knowledge to develop 
relationships in ways that are reciprocally beneficial. Reciprocity relies on a 
contractual form of agreement in which each party is expected to contribute to 
the relationship in measurably and definably equal ways. As Masschelein and 
Simons (2002, p. 597) explain, this is a model that demands that relationships 
be seen as,  
…[…] calculable and calculating relations, as relations in which a transparent 
and reciprocal communication is central. Social relations understood in this 
way rest ideally on a contract or agreement and on negotiation between 
equal, autonomous and entrepreneurial subjects’. (my emphasis) 
 
Diprose (2002), drawing on the phenomenological work of Merleau-Ponty,  
constructs an alternative view of identity as embodied and intersubjective. 
Arguing against the limitations of  ‘contractual relationships’ based on an 
economy of exchange between individuals, she writes about ‘corporeal 
generosity’. This involves an openness to others – an openness that is not 
only a requirement for the establishment of communal relations – but one that 
conceives identity as constructed through openness towards others. Crucially, 
intercorporeal generosity supports notions of alterity and ambiguity and is not 
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based on the assumption that everyone is the same. As Dipose (2002, p. 91) 
puts it, ‘Such “psychological rigidity” is a kind of parsimony that closes off the 
other’s possibilities in direct relation to the reduction of ambiguity involved.’ 
Diprose’s analysis evokes Lesley’s position which she expresses as follows,  
 
But actually, why should you want to get rid of it [autism] anyway because I 
think some of the experiences that we’ve had with Ben are just amazing and 
very humanising really. I mean some of the things he’s able to tell us, I really 
think that some adults would be struggling to find the words for that and the 
fact that we’ve worked very hard together to always find a way of 
understanding each other, it’s sort of very enriching. Nobody in the services 
has told us anything about this at all, we’ve had to find out this for ourselves. 
 
Lesley’s sentiments also resonate with Kittay’s (1999) account (cited in 
Hanisberg and Ruddick, 1999) of parents’ experiences of caring for disabled 
children,   
…with their impairments, with the special care they require, their lives direct 
us to the point and purpose of philosophy – the pursuit of wisdom. Their lives 
help us in our quest to discern what the meaning of life is; what makes life 
worth living or what makes a good life; what makes relationships ethical; what 
personhood is; […] I have always, […], seen philosophy as refracted through 
my experience with Sesha. 
 
Some would assert that such parents are  ‘in denial’, that they have failed to 
grasp the true tragedy of their child’s impairments (see Roll-Petterson, 2001).  
An alternative reading would be that they have developed a more complex 
worldview in which binary opposites based on narrowly defined performance 
criteria of normality are no longer meaningful.  Their narratives evoke 
understandings and insights of life’s entanglements, complexities and 
contingencies which, in turn, appear to promote thinking that is consistent with 
feminist notions of interdependence (see Cushing and Lewis, 2002; 
Sevenhuijsen, 1998, 2000; Tronto, 1993; Williams, 1999, 2002). In the extract 
below taken from an interview with a father, Terry (who has son who has to be 
permanently ventilated), there is no sense that parental devotion, whilst 
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clearly evident, is accompanied by a refusal to take reality ‘on board’. As Terry 
put it, whilst showing a photograph of Ian on his mobile phone,  
He’s great… so those are the vent tubes. He’s got very limited physical ability 
... but he’s so alive and so vital and so he’s still Ian  […] Whilst we embrace 
and love and cherish the Ian that we have, there was a point when we knew 
we’d lost the Ian that we thought we had. 
 
This type of reaction was typical for many parents participating in this study 
who emphasised the mutuality and richness of their relationship with their 
children whilst simultaneously not shying away from the more challenging 
aspects of parenting a disabled child.   In most interviews, one discourse does 
not replace another, instead they intricately interweave, ‘either/ ors’ are 
replaced by ‘ands’.  This complexity of understanding is often connected to a 
sense that subjectivity is constructed around ‘being together’ rather than 
around individualised citizenship (Foucault, 1982, p.232). The idealised self-
sufficient subject is replaced by one embedded in a sense of other-
relatedness. To use Frank’s term (1985, p. 35), the ‘dyadic’ subject is created 
who recognises that ‘…even though the other is a body outside of mine […] 
this other has to do with me, as I with it. [italics in the original].  It also evokes 
the idea  (Longmore cited in McRuer and Wilkerson, 2003) that disabled 
people’s position of marginality provides them with unique insights that point 
the way towards a society based on values of diversity and interdependence.2 
The extract below, was taken from an interview with Tom, 
We’re all going to be…, you know, it’s a cradle to grave, you know, seven 
ages of man, we start new and cheeky and dependent and we’re all going to 
end up that way. And it’s stupid not to create an empathic society that 
responds to people in need… because it involves us all. 
 
                                                          
2
 ‘They [disabled people] declare that they prize not  [….] independence but interdependence, 
not functional separateness but human community. This values-formation takes disability as 
its starting point. ‘ (Longmore cited in McRuer and Wilkerson, 2003, p. 7). 
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Sylvia, a lone parent and wheel-chair user with a young daughter with the 
label of cerebral palsy stated, 
I think about these things. I mean Jane [PA] wouldn’t have a job if I wasn’t 
disabled, you wouldn’t have a job if Sarah [daughter] wasn’t disabled, you 
know, we are all dependent on each other. What’s interesting for me is that 
this changes the value judgement that goes with the idea of dependency. If 
you bring an idea of everybody being dependent on each other, suddenly the 
value judgement starts to go out of the window because you’re beginning to 
say “well actually I can’t function unless these other pieces, or people, are in 
place.”  
 
 
Sadie had been a successful sales manager before the birth of her son, 
Thomas, who has a rare and complex syndrome. Here she explains how the 
‘battles’ involved in caring for him have changed her, 
Oh I’ve definitely grown. Anybody that’s a parent of a kid with special needs – 
well not anybody but most people, find things in them that they never knew 
were there. […] The majority of people find a whole extension in their 
personalities, there’s a whole different level of patience and tolerance, a 
whole endurance level that they didn’t even know they had […] So you do 
grow as a person. I’m a much more tolerant, empathetic person than I ever 
was before.  
 
 
Sadie told me that she would no longer be satisfied with a career in sales as 
she now regarded this as ‘too superficial, too selfish’.  She had recently 
become involved in conscience raising work in relation to Charge [the rare 
syndrome that her son has been diagnosed with]. Now committed to using her  
experience of parenting a disabled child to create a more empathetic climate 
for others in the same position, she stated, ‘My values have changed. I’m no 
longer interested in competition and material success.  I want to  change the 
services so that they are better at improving the connections between people, 
the way people respond to each other – it shouldn’t just be about “fixing” 
people.’  
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According to Gur-Ze’ev’ et al.,  (2001) the subject engaged in this type of 
reflection breaks through the common sense of the normalisation process to 
become  ‘the responsible or ethical subject’ who, in his or her relationships, is 
called upon to transcend dominant narratives’ by discovering some ‘degree of 
authorship’ or counter-authorship by questioning established maxims. The 
parents in this study were clearly engaged in reviewing, writing and rewriting 
dominant narratives that link ‘normality’ to the self-sufficiency of the reflexive 
agent of late modernity.  In its place comes the insight that we are all  
implicated in obligations and dependencies.   
 
(vii) Conclusion 
 
In response to what she sees as encroaching governance, Fraser (1997, p. 
81) has suggested that marginalised groups would be better served through 
the constitution of ‘subaltern counterpublics’ in which they are able to develop 
‘counter discourses’ and construct oppositional interpretations of their 
identities and interests. The narratives of the parents participating in this study 
suggest that they are finding ‘space’ within their private worlds to question 
pre-given understandings in ways that creatively circumnavigate prescriptions 
regarding ‘normality’ based on individualised self-sufficiency and ontological 
separateness. Many parents did not consider that difference should be 
constructed as a problem or an abnormality to be resolved through technical 
interventions but instead regarded their child’s disability as a constituent 
component of human diversity and therefore as a quality to be valued. These 
views are important in the development of more responsive and caring 
services and also for the construction of more positive understandings of 
disability.  Equally, the parents in this study did not generally subscribe to the 
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idea  that the entrepreneurial, autonomous self provides the only blueprint for 
achieving ‘the good life’.  Instead they were embracing alternative ‘ways of 
being’ and are challenging the narrow parameters of individualised citizenship 
that emphasises entrepreneurial success in the public sphere. Many saw  
lives based on mutuality and interdependence not as a form of second-class 
citizenship but as a way of being in which relationships and meanings develop 
in alternative patterns that challenge the boundaries that define normality 
according to narrow measures of self-sufficiency.  
(7,499 words inclusive of bibliography and abstract) 
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